That which the body and mind suffers (in the classical philosophical sense), which means simply that it is something we experience passively rather than active. One may be affected both by internal stimulus, from the imagination, the instinct, or more generally the unconscious (psychoanalysis as a whole is premised on this idea), or external stimulus, which may take a huge variety of forms, from simple physical or sensorial stimuli to complex and cognitive stimuli. Affect is sometimes treated as a synonym for emotion, but as Brian Massumi argues in Parables for the Virtual (2002) it differs from emotion in that it is beyond our voluntary control. For example, we may be able to discipline ourselves to ignore pain in the course of physical training, but we will still feel that pain. Pain, then, belongs to the order of affect and it is autonomous from the circuit of emotion, which is effectively our psychological response to it. In Cultural Studies, in part because of work by Massumi, and also Lauren Berlant, Lawrence Grossberg, Meaghan Morris, and Elspeth Probyn, affect has become a key term for rethinking ideology. It is generally used to explain why ideology has the hold it does. To some degree this interest in affect is sparked by an interest in the work of Deleuze, Gilles, but it also marks a strong turn toward cognitive psychology. In philosophy, affect is central to the work of Baruch de Spinoza and Bergson, Henri, authors from whom Deleuze drew a great deal of inspiration. Further Reading: J. Halley The Affective Turn (2007).